Here's The Full Report About What Happened On Air France Flight 447 -- Sounds Like Pilot Error

France's air-crash investigation agency has released an updated report on what happened aboard Air France Flight 447, which crashed in the Atlantic two years ago.
As described here, the plane stalled at 38,000 feet--meaning that its speed slowed to the point where its wings no longer generated enough lift for the plane to remain in the air--and it then plummeted at 10,000 feet per minute into the Atlantic.
All the way down, the pilots tried to regain control of the aircraft, but failed. The plane remained in a stall despite having all its engines operating normally at full thrust.
(To visualize this, think of a plane with the nose up about 40-degrees-- almost halfway to vertical--falling pretty much straight down, without much air moving over the wings. Planes can't fly like that.).
The report makes it clear that at least one of the plane's speed indicators failed when the plane was flying normally, and when it did, the auto-pilot cut out. The co-pilot then took over manual control of the plane. And, based on the report, it appears he then fatally screwed up.
Specifically, the co-pilot pulled the plane's nose up, causing it to climb and causing its speed to decrease.
Two stall warnings immediately sounded, indicating that the plane's speed was becoming dangerously slow.
Eleven seconds later (not a rapid response), the co-pilot pushed the plane's nose down a bit--but apparently not enough. The plane continued to gain altitude rapidly.
Thirty-five seconds later, the stall-warning sounded again. The co-pilot continued to hold the plane's nose up. It's "angle of attack" (position relative to the air flowing over the wings) continued to increase.
Shortly thereafter, having climbed rapidly from 35,000 feet to 38,000 feet, the plane appears to have stalled, with the co-pilot still holding the controls in a "nose-up" position. (Again, a stall is not an "engine stall"--it is a condition in which the air moving over the wings no longer provides enough lift to keep the plane in the air.)
Fifty seconds later, with the plane back at 35,000 feet and now falling at 10,000 feet per minute, the pilot re-entered the cockpit. (He had been on break with the auto-pilot cut out). The plane's engines remained near full thrust and were operating normally for the rest of the flight. About 35 seconds later, the co-pilot finally pushed the nose down--to no avail.
About 30 seconds after that, still falling at 10,000 feet per minute, the plane passed 10,000 feet.
About 1 minute later, the recordings stopped. The plane was falling at nearly 11,000 feet per minute when it hit the water. Its nose was still up.
Based on this preliminary report, and speaking as someone who has a pilot's license and used to fly small propeller planes, it appears the co-pilot screwed up. He was flying partially blind--one of the plane's airspeed indicators blipped out--but he then moved the controls in a way that slowed the plane down and caused it to stall.
Presumably, when flying an Airbus 330 at 35,000 feet at night in a storm, it is extraordinarily difficult to accurately gauge airspeed without the help of the airspeed indicators. But assuming the plane's altitude and attitude controls were still working, which they appear to have been, the pilot's decision to pull the nose up seems to have been a fatal (and basic) error. Maintaining sufficient airspeed is the single most critical priority in any airplane. Planes cannot fly when they stall, and in many airplanes--most notably jets at high altitudes--it is extremely difficult to recover from a stall. So the pilot's first and most important job is to maintain enough airspeed.
Now, this sounds simple, but at the time it probably was anything but. Immediately figuring out what is going on in an airplane at night when instruments cut out can be very difficult, especially if you don't realize that the instruments have failed. That said, pretty much the first thing you learn in flight school is that when there is any question about having enough airspeed, you push the nose down. Perhaps readers who have flown Airbuses in such conditions can explain how easy this error would have been to make and, once it was made, whether it would have been possible to recover if the pilots had done something different.